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THE UNITARY PROGRESS CLAUSE: DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA V. HELLER AND THE STRUCTURAL 
INTERPRETATION OF THE PROGRESS CLAUSE 
Joshua I. Miller† 
Abstract 
Since around 1950, the Progress Clause of the Constitution has 
been read in a distributive manner. That is to say, it is read as 
granting two separate powers: the power to promote the progress of 
science through copyright, and the power to promote the progress of 
useful arts through patent. This dichotomy has led to some confusion 
in certain subject matter areas that span the two regimes, like 
architectural works, computer programs, and design patents. In 
addition, because the distributive reading effectively separates 
copyright and patent, this reading may undermine certain doctrines, 
such as copyright’s secondary liability or misuse doctrines, which 
have evolved based on a presumed relationship between the regimes. 
The Article extends recent arguments that the Progress Clause 
should be read as a unified power intended to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts. Based on the structural similarities of the 
Second Amendment and Progress Clause, I argue that the structural 
analysis employed by the Supreme Court in D.C. v. Heller is also 
applicable to the Progress Clause.  Based on the Heller analysis, the 
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Article concludes that a unitary reading is, indeed, the proper reading 
of the Progress Clause. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Progress Clause of the Constitution gives Congress the 
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”1 This Clause is 
the source of Congress’s power to enact the patent and copyright 
laws.
2
 The Supreme Court has been turning increasingly to the 
Progress Clause to answer many important questions in intellectual 
property law.
3
 
In 1949, Karl Lutz published an influential article that argued 
that the Progress Clause should be given a distributive reading.
4
 Since 
that time, the distributive reading has been embraced by scholars, the 
legislature, and the courts.
5
 The distributive reading extracts two 
                                                                                                                            
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2. Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 GA. L. REV. 309, 393 (2008) (“Both 
copyright and patent law emanate from the same source: Congress’s power under the Copyright 
and Patent Clause . . . .”). 
 3. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231-57 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(discussing the “constitutional moorings” of patent law in assessing patent eligibility);  
accord, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991) (finding 
that originality is a constitutionally-mandated requirement in copyright law); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
537 U.S. 186, 192-93 (2003) (addressing the constitutionality of copyright term); Golan v. 
Holder, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011) (granting certiorari to determine whether Congress may 
constitutionally remove certain works from the public domain pursuant to the Berne 
Convention). See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Golan, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (No. 10-545). 
 4. See Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 51 (1949) [hereinafter Lutz, Patents and 
Science]; see also Karl B. Lutz, Are the Courts Carrying Out Constitutional Public Policy on 
Patents?, 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 766, 789 (1952) [hereinafter Lutz, Public Policy] (claiming 
that, if lawyers had looked to history, “they would have found that the word ‘science’ belongs 
with the copyright clause . . . .”). 
 5. See, e.g., Dotan Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP: A New Reading, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 421, 463-64 (2009) [hereinafter Oliar, Convention]. Professor Oliar points to 
several sources for his conclusion on scholars. Id. at 463 n.167 (citing 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, 
CHISUM ON PATENTS § OV[3] (Matthew Bender ed. 2011) (“The clause intermixes copyright 
and patent concepts. The patent concepts are ‘useful arts’, ‘inventors’ and ‘discoveries.’”); 1 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] n.11.2 (Matthew 
Bender rev. ed. 2011) (1963) (generally associating “science”, “authors” and “writings”); 
Kenneth J. Burchfiel, The Constitutional Intellectual Property Power: Progress of Useful Arts 
and the Legal Protection of Semiconductor Technology, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 473, 501 
(1988); Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393 (1960)). 
Likewise for the legislature, Oliar points to several sources. Id. at 464 n.168 (citing, H. COMM. 
ON THE JUDICIARY, REVISION OF TITLE 35, UNITED STATES CODE “PATENTS,” H.R. REP. NO. 
82-1923, at 4 (2d Sess. 1952); S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REVISION OF TITLE 35, UNITED 
STATES CODE, S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 3 (2d Sess. 1952)). For court decisions, Oliar cites, for 
example, Eldred v. Ashcroft and In re Comiskey. Id. at 464 n.169 (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
U.S. 186, 192-93 (2003) (“The [Progress Clause] provides as to copyrights: ‘Congress shall 
have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing [to Authors] for limited 
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separate powers from the Progress Clause.
6
 The first is the copyright 
power: to promote the progress of science by securing for limited 
times to authors the exclusive right to their respective writings.
7
 The 
second is the patent power: to promote the progress of the useful arts 
by securing for limited times to inventors the exclusive right to their 
discoveries.
8
 
How the Progress Clause is read dictates the answers to many 
questions in patent and copyright law. For example, the distributive 
reading’s requirement that patents only apply to useful arts has 
contributed to the denial of patent protection for some computer 
programs
9
 and business methods.
10
 With respect to copyright, the 
“functional” aspects of otherwise clearly expressive works have been 
denied protection, in some cases resulting in the entire work being 
denied copyright protection.
11
 
This article responds to Lutz’s arguments. Through historical 
and constitutional examination, the article concludes that the 
distributive reading is not correct. To this end, it extends the 
arguments first put forth by Professor Dotan Oliar, wherein he 
suggests that the current reading of the Progress Clause “rests on 
shaky grounds,”12 and describes the reading as “indefensible.”13 
                                                                                                                            
Times . . . the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings.”); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (“[The Progress Clause] limit[s] the subject matter eligible for patent protection to the 
‘useful Arts.’”)). 
 6. See Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 51. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Compare Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 63 (1972), and Parker v. Flook, 437 
U.S. 584, 584 (1978) (both denying protection to computer program algorithms), with Diamond 
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 175 (1981) (granting patent protection to a computer program that 
resulted in a physical transformation of rubber). 
 10. Although the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 
(2010), did not directly address the Constitution, the decision is clearly rooted in the current 
understanding that patent law is limited to “useful arts.” The Court declined to grant patent 
protection to a business method because it was an “abstract idea.” Id. at 3230. However, the 
Court also implicitly recognized that a business method clearly falls within the language of the 
Patent Act. See id. at 3226 (acknowledging that the statutory definition of “process” is quite 
broad). If not due to the statutory language, the restriction against patenting abstract ideas must 
be constitutional. 
 11. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995) (denying 
protection to plaintiff’s work because it was an uncopyrightable “method of operation”); Brandir 
Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987) (denying copyright 
protection to a bicycle rack where the expressive elements were dictated by “utilitarian” 
considerations). 
 12. Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 469. 
 13. Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of 
Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1823 
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Instead, he proposes what I refer to herein as the “unitary reading” of 
the Progress Clause. Under this reading, “science” and “useful arts” 
are not the separate domains of copyright and patent as they are under 
the dominant reading today. Rather than suggesting that the unitary 
reading is simply the better solution, however, I suggest that the 
Supreme Court’s recent analysis of the Second Amendment in 
District of Columbia v. Heller
14
 actually mandates the reading 
Professor Oliar suggests. 
The Heller decision was driven by a combination of historical 
and structural analysis. As this Article explains, the structural 
similarities between the Second Amendment and the Progress Clause 
warrant the application of the Heller framework to the Progress 
Clause. Based on this conclusion, the Article then engages in the 
same historical/structural analysis as the Supreme Court did in Heller. 
The Article then offers some observations based on this analysis. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the history and 
emergence of the distributive reading, and explains its theoretical 
grounding. Part III discusses how the Supreme Court’s recent analysis 
of the Second Amendment applies to the Progress Clause. Part IV 
presents the history of the progress laws, and Part V describes how 
this history, under any mechanism of constitutional construction, 
yields the conclusion that the unitary reading is the most appropriate 
reading of the Progress Clause. Part VI concludes. 
II. THE DISTRIBUTIVE READING 
The first mention of the distributive reading of which the author 
is aware was made by Justice Marshall in Evans v. Jordan.
15
 Justice 
Marshall’s reference is made without citation or explanation, so its 
basis is difficult to ascertain. The next mention, and first with 
explanation, was made in passing, in the dissent of a mid-nineteenth 
century Supreme Court copyright decision.
16
 Despite this deep 
history, the dominance of the distributive reading of the Progress 
Clause is a relatively recent development in patent law.
17
 It appears to 
have gone unmentioned after that Supreme Court decision in 1834 
                                                                                                                            
(2006) [hereinafter Oliar, Making Sense]. 
 14. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 15. Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813). Because this case offers the 
distributive reading without explanation, it does little to help explain the basis for the reading. 
 16. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 684 (1834) (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
 17. See Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 463-64 (describing Lutz, Patents and Science, 
supra note 4, as the article that initially observed the distributive reading). 
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until it was once again proposed in 1925.
18
 Even then, the distributive 
reading went largely unrecognized by the legal community.
19
 
The distributive reading, in its present form, “was propagated by 
an influential article and consequently adopted by practically all 
members of the legal community . . . and has become the accepted 
wisdom regarding the textual structure of the Clause.”20 This Part 
traces the evolution of the theory from its roots to its final form in 
order to ascertain the interpretive underpinnings of the distributive 
reading. 
A. Justice Thompson’s Dissent in Wheaton v. Peters 
Justice Thompson first explained the distributive reading in his 
dissent in the famous 1834 Supreme Court copyright decision 
Wheaton v. Peters.
21
 He addressed the debate over the definition of 
the word “securing” in the Progress Clause.22 The discussion revolved 
around whether copyright was entirely statutory, or whether there was 
a common law copyright in the United States.
23
 The Court held that 
there was a common law right to unpublished works,
24
 but that there 
was no such right in published works.
25
 
Justice Thompson used the “distributive” reading of the Progress 
Clause to distinguish between the origins of copyright and patent.
26
 
His proposition seems largely rooted in the fact that patent and 
copyright were legislated differently from the outset.
27
 Justice 
                                                                                                                            
 18. See RICHARD C. DE WOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 15 (1925). 
 19. See Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 463-64. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 684 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
 22. See generally id. 
 23. See generally id. 
 24. See id. at 657. 
That an author at common law has a property in his manuscript . . . cannot be 
doubted; but this is a very different right from that which asserts a perpetual and 
exclusive property in the future publication of the work, after the author shall 
have published it to the world. 
Id. 
 25. See id. at 661 (“Congress, then, by this act, instead of sanctioning an existing right, as 
contended for, created it.”). 
 26. See id. at 684 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
It has been argued at the bar, that as the promotion of the progress of science and 
the useful arts, is here united in the same clause in the constitution, the rights of 
authors and inventors were considered as standing on the same footing; but this, I 
think, is a non sequitur. 
Id. 
 27. See id. (“Th[e Progress Clause] is to be construed distributively, and must have been 
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Thompson believed that the statutes themselves spoke to a difference 
between the laws.
28
 The statutes indicated that patent law was created 
solely by statute,
29
 whereas the copyright laws merely secured an 
existing right.
30
 
B. Richard De Wolf and Karl Lutz 
The next step in the evolution of the distributive reading, taken 
almost a century after the first, went relatively unnoticed. In 1925, 
Richard De Wolf made an observation “which appear[ed] not to have 
had the attention of any court.”31 He noted that the Progress Clause 
was “an example of the balanced style of composition so much used 
in the days of the colonial worthies.”32 Further, he said, the word 
“science,” as used when the Constitution was adopted, meant learning 
generally, not the natural sciences we think of today.
33
 Based on the 
language and structure of the Progress Clause, De Wolf concluded 
that it must have been intended to provide separately for science and 
useful arts.
34
 
Although De Wolf’s proposal went largely unnoticed, the 
distributive reading was apparently more appealing in 1949. That year 
saw the publication of the first of a pair of influential articles by Karl 
B. Lutz
35
 that would lead to the emergence of the distributive reading 
as the “accepted wisdom regarding the textual structure of the 
clause.”36 
Lutz presented the distributive reading with the same 
justification as De Wolf—namely, the balanced sentence.37 He added 
further support to his reading by noting that Thomas Jefferson had 
himself used the word “science” to mean general learning, albeit after 
                                                                                                                            
so understood; for when congress came to execute this power by legislation, the subjects are 
kept distinct, and very different provisions are made respecting them.”). 
 28. See id. 
 29. Id. Justice Thompson argues that then-current patent statutes “clearly imply that the 
whole exclusive right is created by the [statute]”. Id. 
 30. Id. at 685 (“All the laws on [copyright] purport to be made for securing to authors 
and proprietors such copyright.”). 
 31. DE WOLF, supra note 18, at 14. 
 32. Id. at 15. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. The pair of articles comprised Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, and Lutz, 
Public Policy, supra note 4. 
 36. See Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 463-64 (describing the Lutz articles as the 
impetus for general adoption of the distributive reading). 
 37. See Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 51. 
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the signing of the Constitution.
38
 Under the balanced sentence 
structure, then, copyright was intended to promote the progress of 
learning in general while patent was intended to promote the progress 
of the useful arts. 
Lutz further supported his argument on the basis of an 
abandoned bill of unknown substance from the first session of 
Congress, which had a title identical to the language of the Progress 
Clause.
39
 The bill passed on its first reading, but died at the 
adjournment of the first session.
40
 At the opening of the second 
session of Congress, it was decided that the copyright and patent laws 
would be provided for separately, and this separation is offered by 
Lutz as justification for the distributive reading of the Progress 
Clause.
41
 
Lutz continued in this vein, offering several other observations in 
order to account for the distributive reading he proposed. For 
example, Representative Burke stated that copyrights could be easily 
dealt with, as it was easy to acquire literary property.
42
 Inventions, on 
the other hand, were not as simple a subject as copyrights.
43
 
Lutz also examined the legislative history of the patent laws over 
the next century.
44
 He observed that “Congress only once . . . included 
the word ‘science’” in the patent laws, and this inclusion was 
accidental.
45
 This statement, however, is simply incorrect: the word 
“science” occurred once in the 1793 Patent Act,46 which replaced the 
original Act passed only three years earlier, and it appeared twice in 
the 1836 Patent Act.
47
 The 1836 amendment not only retained the 
original reference to “science,” but also added an additional 
reference.
48
 This tends to indicate that the inclusion of the word 
“science” was not the accident Lutz contends. Lutz further stated that 
no evidence from the Constitutional Convention indicated that patents 
                                                                                                                            
 38. Id. at 51-52 (noting that Jefferson had, in 1799, referred to “government, religion, 
morality, and every other science.”) (emphasis added). 
 39. Id. at 52. This bill was designated H.R. 10 but no further information about the bill is 
available from direct sources. Edward C. Walterscheid, Charting a Novel Course: the Creation 
of the Patent Act of 1790, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 445, 462-63 (1997). 
 40. Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 52. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. 
 43.  See id. 
 44. See id. at 53. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (1793). 
 47. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, §§ 6, 7, 5 Stat. 117, 119-20 (1836). 
 48. See id. 
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were intended to extend from the “traditional field” of useful arts into 
“science.”49 
Given the timing of Lutz’s publication, it seems quite plausible 
that this widespread acceptance—after the same position had been put 
forth twice before—was rooted largely in the prevailing anti-patent 
sentiment of the period. Perhaps the acceptance of this reading at this 
point in time should have been questioned, as the courts of this era 
were notorious for their anti-patent sentiment.
50
 Justice Jackson 
described the general disposition best: “the only patent that is valid is 
one which th[e Supreme] Court has not been able to get its hands 
on.”51 
Justice Jackson was not exaggerating. From around the mid-
1930s to around 1950, the Supreme Court found patent after patent 
invalid.
52
 The Court even made sure to open the door to the 
government invalidating patents under the guise of actions under the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, even though the “issue need not be decided to 
dispose of th[e] case” in which that door was opened.53 
                                                                                                                            
 49. Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 54.  
Certainly there is nothing in the historical background to provide the 
Constitutional Convention with a motive for suddenly expanding the Anglo-
American concept of patents to include “science” as we use that term today. 
Lacking such evidence, we must assume that the Convention intended to have 
patents stick pretty closely to their traditional field as included in the phrase 
“useful arts.”  
Id. As discussed below, this statement is not entirely correct. There is indeed evidence from the 
Constitutional Convention and shortly thereafter that implies an intention that copyrights and 
patents both be used to encourage the progress of science and the useful arts. See infra Part 
III.B. 
 50. See George E. Frost, Judge Rich and the 1952 Patent Code—A Retrospective, 76 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 343, 343 (1994) (“The Supreme Court . . . was conspicuously 
anti-patent and became progressively more hostile through the 1940’s.”). See also ROBERT 
PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 8-9 (1992). 
 51. Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 52. For Supreme Court cases from this period holding patents invalid, see Great Atl. & 
Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 148-54 (1950); Jungerson, 335 U.S. at 
561-68; Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 128-32 (1948); Dow Chem. 
Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 324 U.S. 320, 324, 331 (1945); Universal Oil Prods. 
Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 486 (1944); United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith 
Co., 317 U.S. 228, 232 (1942); Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 
477, 486 (1935). 
 53. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 387 (1948). U.S. 
Gypsum had admitted at the trial level that the challenged licensing agreement would violate the 
Sherman Act if its patents were invalid. Id. at 386. The government sought to amend its 
complaint to allege invalidity, and the trial court had ruled that the government could not do so. 
Id. at 387. Although the Supreme Court felt the issue “need not be decided,” it still decided the 
issue—and held that the government can attack the validity of patents it had issued. Id. 
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The distributive reading inherently restricts the scope of patent 
law by withdrawing “science” from its protection. Given the judicial 
sentiment against strong patent rights, general acceptance of a 
Constitution-based doctrine that withdrew “science” from patent’s 
protection should come as no surprise. And it should come as no 
surprise that the justifications of a popular theory were accepted with 
little examination. Although the De Wolf and Lutz arguments were 
limited to patent, it should be noted that, under their reading, the 
converse was true as well: copyright could not protect useful arts. 
C. Possible Constitutional Justifications for the Modern 
Distributive Reading 
Justice Thompson’s reading was based in the statutory 
provisions for the two laws rather than the constitutional language 
authorizing them.
54
 He did not question the intent of the Framers, but 
instead examined the legislature’s understanding of the Progress 
Clause.
55
 He seemingly found enough support in the statutory 
separation of the two laws to necessitate a distributive reading under a 
form of original understanding. 
De Wolf’s argument was rooted in the language and sentence 
structure used by the Framers.
56
 He presumed that, since the balanced 
sentence was “so much used” at the time of the framing of the 
Constitution, the Framers must have intended the Progress Clause be 
read in distribution.
57
 The Framers’ use of the word “respectively” 
seems to support De Wolf’s reading, as it indicates that authors and 
inventors are linked exclusively to writings and discoveries. Further, 
they had used distinguishable terms—science and useful arts—to 
draw a line between what should be protected by copyright and what 
should be protected by patent.
58
 
Justice Thompson’s examination of the understanding of the 
Clause and De Wolf’s intent-based argument were seemingly 
unpersuasive on their own, as the distributive reading was not widely 
adopted after either presentation.
59
 Lutz’s conclusion was merely a 
combination of the two prior justifications for the distributive reading. 
Although unpersuasive on their own, when combined by Lutz, at the 
                                                                                                                            
 54. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 684 (1834) (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
 55. See id. 
 56. DE WOLF, supra note 18, at 15. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. at 15-16. 
 59. See Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 463-64. 
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time he combined them, these two arguments became the basis for the 
generally accepted reading of the Progress Clause.
60
 These two 
justifications are, admittedly, persuasive. 
Given this combination, this article therefore proceeds under the 
presumption that some combination of original intent and original 
understanding forms the basis for the modern-day distributive 
reading. As shown in the next Part, recent Supreme Court 
constitutional jurisprudence casts doubt on the propriety of this 
simplified historical analysis. After proposing a structure-based 
framework for interpreting the Progress Clause, this Article will 
present the argument that the unitary reading of the Progress Clause is 
in fact the correct reading. 
III. THE HELLER FRAMEWORK 
Although there is sufficient evidence in the historical record to 
support the unitary reading under the Lutz framework,
61
 this Part 
presents a novel explanation of how the structure of the Progress 
Clause should affect our understanding of the Clause. Based on the 
similarities between the Second Amendment and the Progress Clause, 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Amendment should inform 
the analysis of the Progress Clause. This Part only explains why the 
Second Amendment analysis should apply; Part V actually engages in 
the analysis. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Heller Decision 
The Second Amendment provides that “[a] well regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”62 In Heller, the 
Supreme Court observed that the Second Amendment could be 
rephrased, “Because a well regulated Militia is necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms 
shall not be infringed.”63 
Read this way, it is easy to see what the Court recognized: the 
Second Amendment is actually divided into two separate parts.
64
 The 
                                                                                                                            
 60. See generally Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 51. 
 61. See infra Part IV (arguing that historical evidence demonstrates that the Progress 
Clause was likely both originally intended and originally understood to be given a unitary 
reading). 
 62. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 63. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008). 
 64. See id. 
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Court referred to these parts as the “prefatory clause” and the 
“operative clause.”65 The operative clause gives a command, while 
the prefatory clause “does not limit the latter grammatically, but 
rather announces a purpose.”66 The Court called this structure “unique 
in our Constitution.”67 
The Court concluded that the Amendment’s structure should be 
used as an interpretive tool.
68
 Logically, there must be some 
connection between the two clauses.
69
 This connection means that the 
prefatory clause may only resolve ambiguities in the operative clause; 
it may not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause.
70
 This 
concept of limiting a preamble to an explanatory role was established 
as early as 1716
71
 and was still well recognized in America 
throughout the nineteenth century.
72
 
From this background, the Supreme Court developed a 
framework for analysis of the Second Amendment. The Court began 
its analysis of the text with the language of the operative clause.
73
 
Once the Court determined the meaning of the operative clause, it 
examined the prefatory clause to “ensure that [the Court’s] reading of 
the operative clause is consistent with the announced purpose.”74 For 
both clauses, the Court examined historical evidence to determine the 
ordinary meaning of the language.
75
 Thus, the Court’s analysis 
comprised three steps: (1) determining the meaning of the operative 
language; (2) determining the meaning of the prefatory language; and 
(3) ensuring that the two interpretations are consistent. 
                                                                                                                            
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. (“Logic demands that there be a link between the stated purpose and the 
command.”). 
 70. See id. at 577-78 (The requirement of a logical connection “may cause a prefatory 
clause to resolve an ambiguity in the operative clause . . . . But apart from that clarifying 
function, a prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause.”). 
 71. See Copeman v. Gallant, (1716) 24 Eng. Rep. 404 (Ch.) 407 (“I can by no means 
allow of the notion, that the preamble shall restrain the operation of the enacting clause.”). 
 72. See JOEL BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE WRITTEN LAWS AND THEIR 
INTERPRETATION § 51, p. 49 (1882). The force of the rule in favor of the operative clause was 
reduced in England in 1826, but in America, “the settled principle of law is that the preamble 
cannot control the enacting part of the statute in cases where the enacting part is expressed in 
clear, unambiguous terms.” 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.04, at 146 (7th ed. 2007). 
 73. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 578. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. at 576. 
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This Article does not repeat the Supreme Court’s historical 
review. It is sufficient to say that the Court looked beyond American 
history, to English precedent from as far back as the 17
th
 and early 
18
th
 centuries,
76
 in order to ascertain the meaning of the relevant 
phrases in the Second Amendment. 
B. Heller and the Progress Clause 
The Supreme Court’s claim that the structure of the Second 
Amendment is “unique in our Constitution” is only correct insofar as 
the Amendments are concerned. There is one other provision that 
shares a similar structure: even Second Amendment scholars have 
noted that the Progress Clause shares this structure.
77
 Intellectual 
property scholars and commentators echo substantially the same 
sentiment. They have observed that the Progress Clause is unique 
among congressional powers because it is the only power that 
specifically states its purpose,
78
 or conversely, that it is the only 
power that specifies how that power is to be exercised.
79
 
                                                                                                                            
 76. See id. at 592-93 (considering the 1671 Game Act); accord, e.g., id. at 582 
(considering English law from 1689); id. at 592 (considering the 1689 Declaration of Rights); 
id. at 587 n.10 (citing J. BRYDALL, PRIVILEGIA MAGNATUD APUD ANGLOS 14 (1704)); id. at 
587 n.10 (citing J. BOND, A COMPLEAT GUIDE TO JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 43 (1707)); id. at 578 
n.3 (citing Copeman, 24 Eng. Rep. at 407). 
 77. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
95, 227 n.77 (1980) (noting in a discussion of the Second Amendment that in the Progress 
Clause, “as almost nowhere else the framers and ratifiers apparently . . . [chose] explicitly to 
legislate the goal in terms of which the provision was to be interpreted.”); see also LAURENCE 
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 299 n.6 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that purposive 
language of the Second Amendment is almost unique in the Constitution, and that “the only 
other such language appears in the copyright clause”). Cf. Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace 
Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 793-94 n.1 (1998) (noting that the Progress Clause 
has a similar structure, but distinguishing it because the Progress Clause “deals with 
congressional powers rather than individual rights, and because the grammatical relationship 
between its subclasses is significantly different” from those of the Second Amendment). 
 78. See Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and 
Harm, 51 B.C. L. REV. 905, 918 (2010) (“The purpose of patent and copyright legislation is to 
‘promote the progress of science and useful arts.’”); see also Case Comment, Second Circuit 
Upholds Perpetual Anti-Bootlegging Protection Against Copyright Clause Challenge—United 
States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007), 121 HARV. L. REV. 1455, 1460 (2008) 
(describing the Progress Clause as “unique among the enumerated powers of Article I, Section 
8, in that its purpose is contained within its text: ‘To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.’”); accord, e.g., 1 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 1:18 (2010); Jeffrey 
M. Kuhn, Information Overload at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Reframing the Duty 
of Disclosure in Patent Law as a Search and Filter Problem, 13 YALE J. L. & TECH. 90, 92 
(2010-2011). 
 79. See Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: 
The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States 
Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 32 (1994) [hereinafter Walterscheid, Background] (stating 
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It should be noted that these provisions are not identical: the 
Progress Clause is not exactly comprised of a prefatory and an 
operative clause. Technically, because the power granted by the 
Clause is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” that 
provision both gives a command and announces a purpose.
80
 Still, the 
first provision of the Progress Clause—like the Second Amendment’s 
prefatory clause—announces a purpose: to promote the progress of 
science and the useful arts.
81
 Likewise, the second provision of the 
Progress Clause—the “securing” clause—explains how to achieve 
that purpose. To that end, the second provision gives a command on 
how to achieve the purpose of the first provision. 
Given the structural similarities between the two provisions, I 
propose that the Heller framework should be applied to the Progress 
Clause. It is therefore proper to look first to the “operative”82 
language in the Progress Clause. This language states that Congress 
may “secur[e] for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”83 
After determining the meaning of that language, the analysis 
turns to the prefatory clause. This language states that the purpose of 
the Progress Clause is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.”84 The prefatory clause can only be used to clarify 
ambiguity; it cannot be used to expand or contract the scope of the 
operative language. After presenting historical evidence relevant to 
the Progress Clause in Part IV, Part V of this article will discuss the 
                                                                                                                            
that the Progress Clause “is unique among the congressional powers in that it alone specifies a 
mode for exercising the particular power, i.e., ‘by securing for limited times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.’”). But see Graham v. 
John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966) (“The Congress in the exercise of the 
patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose.”). 
The Court construed the “exclusive Right” clause to be a “qualified authority” which was 
“limited to the promotion of advances in the ‘useful arts’” by way of the “Progress” clause. Id. 
at 5. However, taken in the context of other Article I powers, which all begin with “to . . . ,” it is 
clear that the power contained in the Progress Clause is the power “to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts . . . .” See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. In this case, the “exclusive 
Right” clause may be limiting, but it is certainly not the actual grant of power. 
 80. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. 
 81. Arguably, all the powers provided for in Article I, Section 8 specify their purpose. 
For example, the purpose of the commerce clause is clearly for Congress to regulate commerce. 
See TRIBE, supra note 77, at 298; Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 78, at 917-18. 
 82. Although I acknowledge that the two sub-clauses in the Progress Clause are not 
exactly prefatory and operative, I retain that language for the purposes of this paper so that I 
may refer to the Heller analysis. Thus, the “operative” language of the Progress Clause is the 
“securing” provision, and the “prefatory” language is the purposive provision. 
 83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 84. Id. 
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application of the Heller framework to this evidence. 
IV. THE HISTORY OF THE PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAWS 
This Part engages in a historical analysis of the prefatory 
language of the Progress Clause. This analysis is applicable to both 
the originalism-based argument championed by Lutz, as well as the 
structure-centric Heller framework.
85
 The first section presents some 
preliminary observations to frame the remainder of the historical 
analysis. After these observations, I present and analyze the historical 
evidence. 
A. Preliminary Observations on the Progress Clause 
Before delving into the historical analysis, it is important to 
clarify the meanings of several constitutional terms as they are used in 
this article. This Section makes several observations in order to 
establish the definitions of the six terms relevant to the analysis. 
These terms are science, useful arts, authors, inventors, writings, and 
discoveries.
86
 As this Section explains, all six terms will be used 
exactly as they are in the distributive reading. 
There is little dispute that authors and inventors are directly tied 
to writings and discoveries. The Clause appears to dictate, through the 
use of the word “respective,” that authors are associated with writings 
and inventors with discoveries.
87
 This understanding is further borne 
out by the terms themselves. “One who writes” and “author,” for 
example, were synonymous at the time of the Framing.
88
 Discoveries 
were likewise closely related to inventors.
89
 
The problem, however, is that none of these terms are 
susceptible to a concrete definition. Inventions, for example, could be 
literary works—the creations of authors.90 Similarly, author is defined 
                                                                                                                            
 85. I note here that, where Professor Oliar generally limited his historical review to the 
Constitutional Convention, see generally Oliar, Convention, supra note 5; Oliar, Making Sense, 
supra note 13, I expand my review to include early English precedent in accord with Heller. See 
supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 86. See Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 464. 
 87. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to secure “to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
 88. See NOAH WEBSTER, A COMPENDIOUS DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 354 
(1806) (defining “writer” as “one who writes, an author”). 
 89. See id. at 87 (defining “discovery” as “the act of discovering, an invention”); id. at 
164 (defining “invention” as “a contrivance, discovery, device”). 
 90. See NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: 
INTENDED TO EXHIBIT: I. THE ORIGIN, AFFINITIES AND PRIMARY SIGNIFICATION OF ENGLISH 
WORDS, AS FAR AS THEY HAVE BEEN ASCERTAINED. II. THE GENUINE ORTHOGRAPHY AND 
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at times as something very close to inventor.
91
 
Any attempt to define these operative terms is beyond the scope 
of this article, so the article will instead operate under a broader 
treatment of the language. In accord with the distributive reading, the 
article presumes that “authors” and “writings” appropriately fall under 
the scope of copyright, while “inventors” and “discoveries” are 
appropriate subjects of patent law. The Clause has always been read 
in this manner.
92
 This article therefore declines to define the operative 
language in more concrete terms than to say that the language speaks 
to copyright and patent, just as it does under the distributive reading. 
This Article also uses the prefatory terms, “science” and “useful 
arts,” in exactly the same manner as they are used in the distributive 
reading. Lutz explained both of these terms: “science,” at the time of 
the Framing, meant learning in general.
93
 Meanwhile, “useful arts” 
referred to what we today refer to as “technology.”94 This article 
operates under these definitions. 
With these definitions in mind, the Heller framework can be 
somewhat simplified: the operative language need not be reexamined, 
as the language is already generally understood. Moreover, the Article 
does not challenge the definitions of the prefatory language. Thus, the 
only question is what the relationship is between the prefatory and 
operative language. The remainder of this section analyzes this 
relationship from a historical perspective. 
It is also necessary to address exactly what this Article means 
when it uses the term “patent,” especially in the historical context. 
The modern legal term, “patent,” is derived from the English Royal 
                                                                                                                            
PRONUNCIATION OF WORDS, ACCORDING TO GENERAL USAGE, OR TO JUST PRINCIPLES OF 
ANALOGY. III. ACCURATE AND DISCRIMINATING DEFINITIONS, WITH NUMEROUS AUTHORITIES 
AND ILLUSTRATIONS. TO WHICH ARE PREFIXED, AN INTRODUCTORY DISSERTATION ON THE 
ORIGIN, HISTORY AND CONNECTION OF THE LANGUAGES OF WESTERN ASIA AND OF EUROPE, 
AND A CONCISE GRAMMAR OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 907 (1828) (defining “invention” as, 
among other things, “fiction. Fables are the inventions of ingenious men.”). 
 91. See id. at 131 (defining “author” as “[o]ne who produces, creates, or brings into being 
. . . .”); id. at 907 (defining “inventor” as “one who contrives and produces anything not before 
existing.”). 
 92. See Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 486 (1818) (referring to the Progress 
Clause as the foundation of Congress’s power to grant patents); see also Wheaton v. Peters, 33 
U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 660 (1834) (describing the 1790 Copyright Act as passed in “pursuance” of 
Congress’s Progress Clause power). 
 93. See Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 51. 
 94. Id. at 54 (stating that “‘useful arts,’ as used in the Constitution . . . is best represented 
in modern language by the word ‘technology’” and defining “technology” as “[a]ny practical art 
utilizing scientific knowledge, as horticulture or medicine; applied science contrasted with pure 
science.”). 
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practice of granting special privileges through open letters known as 
“letters patent.”95 A letter patent was a legal mechanism employed by 
the Crown to grant personal privileges, such as commercial 
monopolies for printing books or manufacturing commodities,
96
 in 
furtherance of Royal policies, such as promoting the economic 
development of the English Realm.
97
 These letters patent—whether 
granting industrial or printing privileges—did not secure the property 
rights in inventions that patents do today. Although these early 
English letters patent are not patents in the same sense as we use that 
word today, it is undeniable that they are the ancestors to modern-day 
patents
98
 and copyrights,
99
 and they clearly informed the 
understanding of patents and copyrights in the Founding Era. 
Therefore, these antiquated legal doctrines are arguably still relevant 
in informing our understanding of the laws enacted under the Progress 
Clause today. 
B. Pre-Ratification History of Patent and Copyright Laws 
The Progress Clause of the Constitution was not created in a 
vacuum. The forebears to patent and copyright laws had existed for 
centuries before the United States began its transition to the federal 
form of government.
100
 Indeed, the language of the Progress Clause 
hints at the Framers’ intent to follow English practices.101 Due to the 
presumptive familiarity of delegates to the Constitutional Convention 
with English precedent,
102
 these precedents are a good starting point 
                                                                                                                            
 95. Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600-1836: How Patents Became 
Rights and Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177, 185 (2004) (citing George Ramsey, 
The Historical Background of Patents, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 6, 6-9 (1936)) (“A patent was a 
creature of royal prerogative. It was based on case-specific policy decisions of the monarch to 
confer particular privileges on a certain individual in order to promote some economic, social, or 
political goal.”). See also Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An 
Intellectual History, 1550-1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1259 (2001) [hereinafter Mossoff, 
Development]. 
 96. See infra Part IV.B. 
 97. See Mossoff, Development, supra note 95, at 1259. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See infra Part IV.B.1.b. 
 100. See Walterscheid, Background, supra note 79, at 2. 
 101. See id. at 34 (the language in the Progress Clause seems to have been guided by a 
“desire to follow the English practice of granting exclusive rights through the issuance of 
patents or a similar device.”). 
 102. See id. at 37 (stating that delegates were familiar with the Statute of Monopolies); see 
also Morgan Sherwood, The Origins and Development of the American Patent System, 71 AM. 
SCI. 500, 500 (1983) (suggesting Framers adopted patent system due to familiarity with English 
precedent). 
MILLER 3/23/2012  11:28 AM 
2012] UNITARY PROGRESS CLAUSE 259 
in determining what the public understanding and Framers’ intentions 
may have been.
103
 
1. English Precedent 
a. “Industrial” Letters Patent and the Statute of 
Monopolies 
In 1331, King Edward III granted the first industrial “letter 
patent” to John Kempe of Flanders.104 This and letters patent like it 
were granted as protection for foreigners willing to come to England 
to train English subjects in the foreigners’ trades.105 Kempe, for 
instance, was a weaver by trade.
106
 The patent to Kempe was the first 
step in a “deliberate and vigorous policy to expand English industry 
which Edward III and his successors pursued with excellent 
results.”107 
British monarchs did not begin issuing letters patent for domestic 
manufacturing within England until the mid-sixteenth century.
108
 The 
first such domestic industrial patent was granted to Henry Smyth in 
1552 for the production of Normandy glass.
109
 Following such 
practice, Queen Elizabeth I granted fifty-five patents during her reign 
                                                                                                                            
 103. For detailed histories of the English precedents, see generally Walterscheid, 
Background, supra note 79; Tyler T. Ochoa and Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the 
Patent and Copyright Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 909 (2002) [hereinafter 
Ochoa & Rose]. Both provide significant background on the precedent relevant to the Progress 
Clause. But see generally Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About 
Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953 
(2007) (questioning the veracity of some of the historical sources and legal terms of art relied on 
by Walterscheid, Ochoa, and Rose). 
 104. See Mossoff, Development, supra note 95, at 1259 (citing Pat. 5 Edw. III, p. I, m. 25 
(1331)). 
 105. See id. 
 106. LIEN BICH LUU, IMMIGRANTS AND THE INDUSTRIES OF LONDON, 1500-1700 54 
(1967). 
 107. Ramon A. Klitzke, Historical Background of the English Patent Law, 41 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 615, 625 (1959). 
 108. See Mossoff, Development, supra note 95, at 1260. 
 109. See, e.g., id.; Klitzke, supra note 107, at 629. The patent stated that Smyth was to 
introduce: 
[B]rode glasse of like fasshion and goodes to that which is commonly called 
Normandy glasse which shall not only be a great commoditie to our said realme 
and dominions but also bothe in the price of the glasse aforesaid and otherwise a 
benefite to our subjectes and besydes that dyvers of theym maye be sett to worke 
and get their lyvying and in tyme learne and be hable to make said glasse them 
selfe and so from tyme to tyme instructe the others in that science and feate.  
Id. (quoting Davies, Further Light on the Case of Monopolies, 48 L. Q. REV. 396 
(1932)). 
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over the latter half of the sixteenth century.
110
 At least one of these 
early patents explicitly referred to “science” as the foundation for the 
protected innovation.
111
 
Challenges raised to some of these patents foreshadowed modern 
patent issues. Several cases, for example, implicated what would 
evolve into questions of novelty and obviousness.
112
 As the law 
evolved, patents became subject to certain conditions. The patentee 
must: (i) work the patent; (ii) not interfere with established industries; 
and (iii) train apprentices.
113
 
Despite Queen Elizabeth’s efforts at stimulating domestic 
industry,
114
 and her initial adherence to the conditions for patent 
grant,
115
 she began to use the patent power in a manner inconsistent 
with the original purpose or conditions of patent.
116
 As she saw it, 
“her Prerogative Royall may not be called in question for the 
valliditie of the letters patents.”117 One of the most egregious 
                                                                                                                            
 110. Mossoff, Development, supra note 95, at 1261. For a list of patents granted by Queen 
Elizabeth, see Edward Wyndham Hulme, The Early History of the English Patent System, in 3 
SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 117, 122-138 (Ass’n of Am. Law 
Schools ed., 1909) [hereinafter Hulme, Early History]. 
 111. See Hulme, Early History, supra note 110 at 137 (citing Edward Wright’s patent for 
“[a]nother water-raising device, obtained ‘by long and painful study of the mathematical 
sciences’”). Admittedly, the actual device is clearly among the “useful arts,” but the fact remains 
that the patent’s language expressly states that it was a work of science being protected. 
 112. See, e.g., 17 CHARLES VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY 210-
11 (2d ed. 1793) (citing Mathey’s case, Noy 113). Viner’s Abridgement summarized Matthey’s 
case thusly: 
So where a patent was granted to A. for the sole making of knives with bone 
hafts, and plates of lattin; because, as the patents suggested, he brought the first 
use thereof from beyond seas; yet nevertheless, when the wardens of the 
company of cutlers shewed before some of the council, and some learned in the 
law, that they used to make knives before, though not with such hafts; and 
that such a light difference or invention should be no cause to restrain them; 
thereupon he could never have benefit of this patent, although he laboured very 
greatly therein. 
Id. It is worth noting that the actual date of Mathey’s case is unknown. What is known, 
though, is that the case addressed Elizabeth’s 25th patent, granted in 1571. See Mossoff, 
Development, supra note 95, at 1262 n.29. Following Mathey’s case, Bircot’s case 
resolved that “no old manufacture in use before can be prohibited.” 3 EDWARDO COKE, 
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 183 (1797). 
 113. See Mossoff, Development, supra note 95, at 1261. 
 114. See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Laws: 
Antecedents (Part 2), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 849, 855 (1994) [hereinafter 
Walterscheid, Evolution]. 
 115. See Mossoff, Development, supra note 95, at 1262. 
 116. See id. at 1264-65. 
 117. Walterscheid, Evolution, supra note 114, at 863 (citing E. BURKE INLOW, THE 
PATENT GRANT 21 (1950)). The quoted text is originally from 32 ACTS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL 
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instances of Queen Elizabeth’s abuse was a patent granted to Edward 
Darcy in 1598 for the manufacture, importation and sales of playing 
cards.
118
 The King’s Bench held the patent invalid in the landmark 
case Darcy v. Allen
119
 (“The Case of Monopolies”). The basis of that 
holding was that a patent should not be used to withdraw from general 
access something already available to the public.
120
 This holding was 
emphasized in another famous case a short time later.
121
 
English monarchs continued to abuse the patent power after The 
Case of Monopolies was decided,
122
 and the Statute of Monopolies 
was enacted in 1623 as a response to the monarchy’s ongoing 
abuse.
123
 The Statute broadly declared monopolies invalid, and this 
Statute was regarded as “the first and final source of authority” on the 
subject of patents in England (and its colonies) from the seventeenth 
century onwards.
124
 
The Statute of Monopolies included several exceptions where 
monopolies might be found valid. The most commonly cited 
exception with respect to patent law stated that a monopoly could be 
appropriately granted for the “sole working or makinge of any manner 
of new Manufactures.”125 While this exception made it possible for 
the Crown to continue to grant “industrial” patents through this 
                                                                                                                            
237 (1601). 
 118. See Hulme, Early History, supra note 110, at 137-38. 
 119. Darcy v. Allen, (1603) 74 Eng. Rep. 1131 (K.B.) 1133. 
 120. See id. at 1139. Allen’s counsel argued: 
[W]here any man by his own charge and industry, or by his own wit or invention 
doth bring any new trade into the realm, or any engine tending to the furtherance 
of a trade that never was used before; and that for the good of the realm; that in 
such cases the King may grant to him a monopoly patent for some reasonable 
time, until the subjects may learn the same, in consideration of the good that he 
doth bring by his invention to the commonwealth; otherwise not. 
Id. See also id. at 1141 (Allen’s counsel arguing that the patent “doth but take the trade of 
making and selling cards from many persons, and giveth that trade to one, which is unlawful.”). 
 121. See The Clothworkers of Ipswich, (1615) 78 Eng. Rep. 147 (K.B.) 148. Holding that 
the King 
cannot make a monopoly for that is to take away free-trade, which is the 
birthright of every subject . . . . [W]hen the trade is become common, and others 
have been bound apprentices in the same trade, there is no reason that such 
should be forbidden to use it. 
Id. 
 122. See Ochoa & Rose, supra note 103, at 679; accord Mossoff, Development, supra note 
95, at 1270. 
 123. Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 & 22 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.). 
 124. Edward Wyndham Hulme, The History of the Patent System under the Prerogative 
and at Common Law, 12 L. Q. REV. 141, 142 (1896) [hereinafter Hulme, Prerogative]. 
 125. Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 & 22 Jac. I, c. 3, § 6 (Eng.). 
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exception,
126
 the story of patent is not limited to this type of patent, or 
this exception in the Statute. 
b. Printing Patents and the Stationers’ Company 
Two other exceptions to the Statute of Monopolies are relevant 
to the history of the Progress Clause, though it appears that they are 
not given the same deference as the manufacturing exception in patent 
scholarship. These exceptions applied to Crown-chartered guilds
127
 
and to printing patents.
128
 The background of these two exceptions is 
just as pertinent to the Progress Clause as that of industrial letters 
patent, especially because they arose under the “first and final source” 
on English patent law but were, in large part, two copyright 
exceptions. Along with the exception for manufactures,
129
 these 
exceptions were a first step toward both a modern form of intellectual 
property right and a distinction between patent and copyright.
130
 
The Stationers’ Company was one of many Crown-chartered 
guilds in sixteenth-century London.
131
 The history of the guild runs to 
1403, but it was not until May 4, 1557 that the Stationers’ Company 
(“Company”) was chartered.132 Although the Company’s power was 
generally limited geographically, its charter gave it nearly a complete 
monopoly over printing.
133
 This power made the Stationers’ Company 
the “focal point of the history of copyright.”134 This focus developed 
through the Stationers’ clever exploitation of two privileges: the 
“copyright” developed under the Stationers’ charter and the royal 
printing patent. 
Stated succinctly, the Stationers’ copyright was a right 
recognized by members of the Company that entitled one who 
published a work to prevent unauthorized printing of the same 
work.
135
 The key point to be taken from the Stationers’ copyright at 
this juncture is that, after its early years, it became wholly 
                                                                                                                            
 126. Id. 
 127. See id. at § 9. 
 128. See id. at § 10. 
 129. See id. at § 6. 
 130. As is discussed in the remainder of this section, Sections 9 and 10 of the Statute of 
Monopolies created exceptions to the ban on monopolies that would eventually evolve into 
copyright. 
 131. See LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 28 (1968). 
 132. Id. at 28-29. 
 133. See id. at 32. 
 134. Id. at 28. 
 135. Id. at 43-44. 
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independent from the printing patent, and that it was a monopoly 
within the “Crown-chartered guilds” exception to the Statute of 
Monopolies—the statute typically treated as addressing patent law. 
The other relevant exception to the Statute of Monopolies was 
the exception for printing patents. Despite the Stationers’ efforts to 
control printing through their copyright, the first book printed with 
sovereign privilege was printed in either 1512 or 1518.
136
 One of 
these appears to be the first granted printing patent.
137
 Notably, both 
of these domestic English printing patents were granted almost half a 
century before the Smyth patent, the first domestic English industrial 
patent.
138
 
Printing patents came in two flavors. General printing patents 
covered entire classes of works, like law books, while a particular 
printing patent covered a specific work.
139
 Particular printing patents 
therefore limited the reproduction of specific works, such as A B C 
with the Little Catechism
140
 and Cosmographical Glass.
141
 
Printing patents were granted under the same royal prerogative 
as industrial patents, and indeed, there appears to be little to 
distinguish between the two patents, save their subject matter.
142
 
Printing patents appear to be merely an aspect of the original patent 
system, which was intended to encourage industrial development.
143
 It 
can then be said that printing patents, on texts, were used with the 
purpose of promoting the progress of useful arts. 
It appears that this close relationship was recognized by the 
Stationers’ Company. The Company apparently viewed the playing-
                                                                                                                            
 136. See THOMAS LINACRE, LINACRI PROGYMNASMATA GRAMMATICES VULGARIA 
colophon (London, Johan Rastell c. 1512).  
Emprynted in London on ye sowth syde of paulys by John Rastell with ye 
priuylege of our most suuerayn lord kyng Henry the. viii. grauntyd to the 
compyler therof. that noo man in thys hys realme sell none but such as the same 
copyler makyth pryntyd for ye space of ii. yeere.  
Id.; PATTERSON, supra note 131, at 42 (stating that the first printing patent was granted in 1518). 
 137. It seems likely that the Linacre patent was the first. See H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, 
What History Teaches Us About Copyright Injunctions and the Inadequate-Remedy-At-Law 
Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197, 1213 (2008) (stating that “[t]he earliest exclusive 
printing privilege of which there is any record in England” is the Rastell/Linacre patent). 
 138. The Smyth patent was granted in 1552. See Klitzke, supra note 106, at 629. 
 139. See PATTERSON, supra note 131, at 79. 
 140. See id. at 40. 
 141. See id. at 79. 
 142. See id. at 82 (it is “difficult to distinguish the basis of the printing patent from the 
basis of the industrial patent.”); see also id. at 84. 
 143. See id. at 82. 
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cards patent in The Case of Monopolies as a printing patent, despite 
the fact that suit was brought as if the patent was industrial.
144
 This 
belief was echoed by at least one modern scholar, who called the 
patent at issue in The Case of Monopolies a “fusion” of printing and 
industrial patents.
145
 
Although printing patents were in fact patents, there was a great 
deal of overlap between printing patents and copyrights. A 1582 
report on printing patents referred to the rights possessed by printing 
patentees as “Copies.”146 The Stationers’ copyright also controlled 
“copies.”147 The major difference was that the printing patent was a 
copyright granted by the sovereign,
148
 while the Stationers’ copyright 
was a private copyright.
149
 This distinction resulted in many of the 
other differences.
150
 Still, the fact remains that the printing patent and 
the Stationers’ copyright performed essentially the same function on 
essentially the same subject matter.
151
 
It actually appears that the Stationers’ copyright would not have 
adequately prevented competitive publication without the printing 
patent.
152
 Even as the Stationers developed their copyright, they 
actively pursued legislation that would allow them to patent copies of 
books.
153
 For a time after the Stationers’ copyright became an 
established privilege, the printing patent remained the preferred form 
of protection.
154
 It appears that if patent law had not laid the 
foundation for copyright, copyright would not exist, at least in the 
form it does today. 
Even after copyright became an established privilege, printing 
patents were used to prevent unauthorized copying.
155
 Cases 
frequently arose where the printing patent and Stationers’ copyright 
                                                                                                                            
 144. See id. at 84-85. 
 145. Id. at 84. 
 146. Id. at 36. 
 147. See id. at 46-47. 
 148. Id. at 78. 
 149. Id. at 79. 
 150. See id. at 79. 
 151. See id. at 80. 
 152. See id. at 90-91. 
 153. See id. at 104. In 1584, the Stationers initiated their efforts to convince the Star 
Chamber to secure protection by legislation. Id. In 1586, a petition was submitted to the Star 
Chamber entitled “The Arguments of the Patentees in Favour of Privileges for Bookes.” The 
petition specifically referred to “Authors” and “Copie[s].” Id. at 104-105. 
 154. See PATTERSON, supra note 131, at 78. 
 155. See id. 
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were held by different parties.
156
 In such instances, the printing patent 
prevailed.
157
 
The Stationers’ copyright survived the enactment of the Statute 
of Monopolies under the exception for Crown-chartered guilds,
158
 
while printing patents survived under their own exception.
159
 This 
history shows that one of the two English statutes relevant to the 
Progress Clause actually supported the use of patents to restrict 
dissemination of literary copies in order to induce industrial 
development. At its most basic, the printing patent acted as a 
copyright.
160
 Thus, patent was, from its very first domestic use in 
England, applied to what the Framers called “science,” or what is 
called “expression” today, yet it was still a patent. Furthermore, 
patents on expression were understood to promote industrial 
progress.
161
 
c. The Statute of Anne 
It is only necessary to briefly address the Statute of Anne here. 
Unlike the Statute of Monopolies and the associated history, the 
Statute of Anne provides little insight into the constitutional question 
at issue. As enacted, the Statute of Anne only applied to the 
Stationers’ copyright and the new “statutory” copyright created by the 
Statute.
162
 
While it appears that the Statute of Anne was essentially a 
codification of the Stationers’ copyright that provided a limited term 
for the copyright,
163
 printing patents were not changed by the Statute 
of Anne. Admittedly, the printing patents were of relatively little 
importance by the time the Statute of Anne was passed in 1709,
164
 but 
printing patents were still being successfully enforced in the late 
seventeenth century
165
 and they were still being asserted well into the 
                                                                                                                            
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 & 22 Jac. I, c. 3, § 9 (Eng.). 
 159. See id. at § 10. 
 160. See PATTERSON, supra note 131, at 80. 
 161. Both the Crown and the Stationers’ Company viewed printing patents as mechanisms 
for encouraging industrial progress. See id. at 82 (noting that the general purpose of printing 
patents was to encourage industrial development); cf. id. at 109 (discussing the pooling of 
printing patents to provide economic incentives to poor members of the Company). 
 162. See PATTERSON, supra note 131, at 143. 
 163. See id. at 146-47. 
 164. Id. at 144. 
 165. See, e.g., Co. of Stationers v. Seymour, (1667) 86 Eng. Rep. 865 (K.B.); Co. of 
Stationers v. Parker, (1685) 90 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B.) 107-08 (citing Roper v. Streater (1670)); 
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eighteenth century.
166
 As late as 1775, in Carnan’s Case, printing 
patents were asserted by the Stationers and the defendants asserted a 
copyright defense to the patent claim.
167
 Defendants also referred to 
patents during their argument.
168
 The court, like the Stationers, 
referred only to patents.
169
 All of this shows that there was no bright 
line between patents and copyrights, even in 1775, just a few short 
years before the Progress Clause was ratified. 
d. Conclusions to be Drawn from English Precedent 
There are several important points to be gleaned from this 
history of English precedent. First is the fact that patent law has, since 
its beginning, been applied to expressive content. Equally noteworthy 
is the fact that the first English patent was not an industrial patent but 
a printing patent,
170
 and this patent was intended to promote 
industry.
171
 Printing patents like the first survived unchanged through 
major patent and copyright legislation.
172
 Perhaps most importantly, 
these patents were still being actively enforced around the time the 
Constitution was being written.
173
 It is therefore unacceptable to 
ignore the history and existence of printing patents in interpreting the 
Progress Clause. 
2. American Precedent 
All of the above demonstrates that there was significant overlap 
in subject matter between English patents and copyrights. The history 
of English law supports application of patent law to what the Framers 
called science, not just the useful arts.
174
 Pre-constitutional American 
history also supports this conclusion, as well as the corollary that 
copyright promotes the progress of useful arts. 
                                                                                                                            
Co. of Stationers v. Lee, (1682-1683) 89 Eng. Rep. 927 (K.B.) 928 (citing Mayo v. Hill (1672)). 
 166. See generally Stationers’ Co. v. Carnan, (1775) 96 Eng. Rep. 590 (K.B.). 
 167. See id. at 591-92 (arguing that the asserted patents lacked any “of the true grounds, on 
which a prerogative copyright can be founded.”). 
 168. See id. at 592. 
 169. See id. at 592-93. 
 170. The first printing patent was granted in the 1510’s. See LINACRE, supra note 136 
(claiming a printing privilege in 1512); PATTERSON, supra note 131, at 86-87 (stating that the 
first printing patent was granted in 1518). 
 171. PATTERSON, supra note 131, at 82. 
 172. See Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 & 22 Jac. 1, c. 3, §§ 9-10 (Eng.). 
 173. See generally Carnan, 96 Eng. Rep. 590. 
 174. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
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a. Pre-Constitutional Colonial and State Progress 
Laws 
The Progress Clause was drafted “against the immediate 
backdrop of the Articles of Confederation, but within the overall 
framework of the English, colonial, and state practices regarding 
patents and copyrights.”175 Having already discussed the English 
framework, this Section discusses the colonial and state practices and 
their relevance to interpretation of the Progress Clause. 
Under the Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress 
did not have the authority to issue copyrights or patents.
176
 After 
several authors petitioned the Continental Congress on the topic of 
literary property,
177
 a committee was appointed “to consider the most 
proper means of cherishing genius and useful arts throughout the 
United States by securing to the authors or publishers of new books 
their property in such works.”178 The committee was “persuaded that 
nothing is more properly a man’s own than the fruit of his study, and 
that the protection of literary property would greatly tend to 
encourage genius, to promote useful discoveries, and to the general 
extension of the arts and commerce.”179 In response to the 
committee’s findings, the Continental Congress urged states to secure 
copyrights to authors or publishers.
180
 
Some states, including Massachusetts, Connecticut, and 
Maryland, had adopted copyright laws prior to this Resolution,
181
 but 
                                                                                                                            
 175. Walterscheid, Background, supra note 79, at 3. 
 176. See Ochoa & Rose, supra note 103, at 686. 
 177. 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 326 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922) (The 
May 2, 1783 installment makes note of “sundry papers and memorials from different persons on 
the subject of literary property” that were submitted to Congress). 
 178. NATIONAL ARCHIVES, PAPERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, no. 36, II, fol. 113-
14, reprinted in BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 112 
(1967) (emphasis added). 
 179. JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 177, at 326 (emphasis 
added). 
 180. See Resolution of May 2, 1783, reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1783-1906 11 (Thorvald Solberg ed., 2d ed. 1906) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT 
ENACTMENTS]. The Resolution encouraged states: 
[T]o secure to the authors or publishers of any new books not hitherto printed . . . 
the copy right of such books for a certain time not less than fourteen years from 
the first publication; and to secure to the said authors, if they shall survive the 
term first mentioned, . . . the copy right of such books for another term of time 
not less than fourteen years. 
Id. 
 181. See Act of Jan. 29, 1783 (Conn.), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 
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every state had the authority to exercise copyright laws.
182
 Among 
those states that adopted copyright provisions, North Carolina’s 
Copyright Act of 1785 stated in its preamble that the “security of 
literary property must greatly tend to encourage genius, to promote 
useful discoveries, and to the general extension of arts and 
commerce.”183 South Carolina took the Resolution a step further by 
including a general patent law in its copyright statute.
184
 The other 
states did not do so, instead opting to enact individual patents.
185
 
Although this pre-Constitutional evidence is not conclusive, it 
does show that the Continental Congress and several of the states 
thought that copyright could be used to promote the useful arts. 
Furthermore, the committee appointed to address the copyright issue 
used several of the constitutional terms—a point that is made more 
relevant, as will be shown, by the fact that James Madison was one of 
the committee members.
186
 
b. The Constitutional Convention 
Further support for a unitary reading of the Progress Clause is 
found in the Constitutional Convention. Discussions at the 
Constitutional Convention of what became the Progress Clause may 
indicate that the Framers intended the clause to be unitary. Because 
the Progress Clause was not debated after introduction,
187
 much of 
this section is derived from the background proposals of the two 
people most closely associated with the intellectual property-related 
powers: James Madison and Charles Pinckney. 
The Federal Convention convened on May 25, 1787 in 
                                                                                                                            
180, at 11-13; Act of Mar. 17, 1783 (Mass.), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 
180, at 14-15; and Act of April 21, 1783 (Md.), reprinted in COPYRIGHT 
ENACTMENTS, supra note 180, at 15-16. 
 182. See 1 GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
FROM THEIR DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE TO THE CLOSE OF THEIR CIVIL WAR 531 (Joseph 
C. Clayton ed., 1896) (stating that every state had authority to exercise copyright law). 
 183. See Act of Nov. 19, 1785 (N.C.), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 
180, at 25. 
 184. See Act of Mar. 26, 1784 (S.C.), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 
180, at 23 (emphasis added). 
 185. See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 57-58 (2002). 
 186. See JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 176, at 211. The other 
members of the committee were Hugh Williamson of North Carolina and Ralph Izard of South 
Carolina. 
 187. See Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 
17 GEO. L.J. 109, 114 (1929). 
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Philadelphia.
188
 William Jackson, the Convention’s secretary, 
recorded an official journal of the proceedings.
189
 James Madison kept 
his own private, more detailed journal as well.
190
 These journals agree 
that intellectual property was not addressed for the first several 
months of the Convention,
191
 and an early draft of the Constitution did 
not mention it either.
192
 
Intellectual property powers were first proposed among a list of 
twenty powers on August 18, 1787.
193
 Several of these powers were 
quite clearly directed towards improving or encouraging innovation— 
including those directed at universities, public institutions, and 
rewards or encouragements for innovation.
194
 
Although none of these powers were incorporated into the 
Constitution, at least in their initial form, they appear to be the basis 
of the eventual Progress Clause.
195
 This is because the Progress 
Clause essentially provides a desirable purpose (promoting progress) 
and means for achieving it (by securing rights). This combination of 
purpose and means does not appear in any single proposed power.
196
 
Instead, a combination of the proposals by both Charles 
Pinckney and James Madison speak to the Progress Clause’s specific 
combination of purpose and means. Pinckney and Madison each 
                                                                                                                            
 188. Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 426. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL (Aug. 6, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 177-89 (Max Farrand ed., 1927). 
 193. See Convention’s Journal (Aug. 18, 1787), in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1786-1870, H.R. DOC. NO. 529, at 130-31 
(2d Sess. 1894). 
. . . To secure to literary authors their copy rights for a limited time 
To establish an University 
To encourage, by proper premiums and provisions, the advancement of useful 
knowledge and discoveries . . .  
To establish seminaries for the promotion of literature and the arts and science . 
. . 
To grant patents for useful inventions 
To secure to authors exclusive rights for a certain time 
To establish public institutions, rewards and immunities for the promotion of 
agriculture, commerce, trades, and manufactures. 
Id. (italics added). 
 194. See id.; see also Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 447-49. 
 195. See Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 425. 
 196. See id. at 425; see generally JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 
177. 
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proposed separate powers for copyright, patent, education, and 
encouragement of innovation.
197
 Both men’s patent and copyright 
powers were exceedingly simple, granting Congress the power to 
secure or grant a right with no other guidance or limitation.
198
 With 
the exception of Madison’s education power, the remaining education 
and encouragement proposals were all directed at what can readily be 
described as the promotion of progress of innovation.
199
 Pinckney’s 
proposals included the encouragement of literature, the arts and 
sciences, agriculture, commerce, trade and manufacture.
200
 Madison’s 
included the advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries.
201
 
Based on the evident relationship between these proposals, it 
seems likely that the Progress Clause was a distillation of all eight of 
the related powers proposed by Madison and Pinckney.
202
 If this is so, 
it seems inappropriate to completely disjoin copyright and patent 
from each other as the distributive reading does. Several of the 
proposed powers were directed at subject matter that clearly spans 
both copyright and patent.
203
 One of the common justifications for 
patent and copyright is incentivizing innovators,
204
 and education 
clearly speaks to general and technical knowledge. It seems then that 
copyright and patent, as embodied in the Progress Clause, were 
intended to work together to promote both science and the useful arts. 
c. Conclusion from American Precedent 
As with the English precedent, several points can be taken 
towards understanding the Progress Clause. First is that the 
Continental Congress—and especially James Madison—believed that 
the progress of useful arts could be promoted by securing copyright to 
authors.
205
 Second, the initially proposed powers which appear to 
                                                                                                                            
 197. Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 446-47. 
 198. Madison’s copyright and patent powers, respectively, read: “to secure to literary 
authors their copyrights for a limited time,” and “to secure to the inventors of useful machines 
and implements the benefits thereof for a limited time.” Id. at 447. Pinckney’s proposals read: 
“to secure to authors exclusive rights for a certain time,” and “to grant patents for useful 
inventions.” Id. 
 199. See id. at 447; see also Oliar, Making Sense, supra note 13, at 1806. 
 200. Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 447. 
 201. Oliar, Making Sense, supra note 13, at 1806. 
 202. See id. at 1805-10. 
 203. See, e.g., JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 177, at 326. 
 204. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property 
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993 (1997); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use 
in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1180 (2000). 
 205. See Resolution of May 2, 1783, reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 
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have evolved into the Progress Clause spoke of encouragement of 
broader scope of subject matter than just science or just useful arts.
206
 
This pre-constitutional history evidences what today might be 
considered anathema: patent promoting the sciences and copyright 
promoting the useful arts. 
C. Early Post-Ratification History of American Patent and 
Copyright Laws 
This section turns to the early post-ratification history of the 
Progress Clause. Because this part of the Progress Clause’s history is 
relevant to original understanding, it is restricted to a much smaller 
temporal window. Specifically, this part addresses early progress 
legislation and judicial interpretations. 
1. Statutory Language 
The first patent and copyright laws were enacted in 1790.
207
 The 
Patent Act was entitled “An Act to promote the progress of useful 
Arts.”208 The Copyright Act was named “An Act for the 
encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, Charts, 
And books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the 
times therein mentioned.”209 The name of the 1790 Patent Act appears 
to unequivocally support the idea that patents apply only to the useful 
arts,
210
 while the 1790 Copyright Act’s title refers to “learning,”211 
which might be understood as a reference to science.
212
 
The patent laws were amended in 1793.
213
 The 1790 and 1793 
laws were largely the same, save for one major change: the 1793 Act 
amended the written description section of the 1790 Act. Where the 
1790 Act required that the written description enable a “person skilled 
in the art or manufacture” to make the invention,214 the 1793 Act 
                                                                                                                            
180, at 11. 
 206. See JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 177, at 326. 
 207. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790); Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 
Stat. 124 (1790). 
 208. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109. 
 209. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
 210. Titles can be used to assist in understanding a statute. See Brotherhood of R.R. 
Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947) (Stating that titles or 
headings are to be considered in resolving ambiguity but “cannot limit the plain meaning of the 
text.”). 
 211. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
 212. See Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 51. 
 213. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (1793). 
 214. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109 (1790). 
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required it to enable a “person skilled in the art or science” to make 
the invention.
215
 
The addition of “science” to the written description provision is 
important for two reasons. First, the amendment essentially used the 
language of the entire preamble to the Progress Clause, rather than 
just a portion of it.
216
 The short life of the 1790 Act, added to the fact 
that one of the few substantive changes was to replace “manufacture” 
with “science,”217 indicates either that the legislature saw this as an 
important amendment or, at a minimum, that they viewed “science” 
and “manufacture” as analogous. 
Second, the structure of the section referring to “science” 
indicates a view of science as part of the patent regime. The language 
of that section makes clear that the thing invented or discovered is an 
“art, machine, or improvement.”218 However, the invention is 
promoting an “art or science.”219 
While the early copyright acts did not refer to “science” in a 
manner similar to the patent law’s reference to useful arts, the 
Copyright Act of 1802 did use constitutional language: it protected 
any person “who shall invent . . . historical and other prints” or who 
“from his own works and inventions” caused the same to be made.220 
Copyright continued to refer to invention in copyright laws until 
1905.
221
 
Although the 1836 Patent Act was much further removed from 
the ratification of the Constitution, and is therefore of less value in 
ascertaining original understanding, it is still one of the next most 
recent pieces of legislation in determining this original understanding 
of the Progress Clause. Like the 1790 Patent Act before it, the 1836 
Act explicitly referred to “science” in its written description 
section.
222
 It also added a second reference, this time in the context of 
                                                                                                                            
 215. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318. 
 216. Id. Notably, the section never uses the full constitutional phrase “useful arts,” but 
instead refers only to arts. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. (“every inventor . . . shall swear . . . that he is the true inventor or discoverer of the 
art, machine, or improvement, for which he solicits a patent”). 
 219. See id. (the written description must “enable any person skilled in the art or science” 
to practice the invention). 
 220. See Copyright Act of 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171 (1802) (repealed 1831). 
 221. See Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 2, 16, 4 Stat. 436, 436, 439 (1831) (repealed 
1870); Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (1870) (amended 1905) (granting 
copyright protection to any “author, inventor, designer, or proprietor” of protected works); 
Copyright Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1432, § 4952, 33 Stat. 1000, 1000 (1905). 
 222. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). 
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a board of examiners, which were to be selected for their “knowledge 
and skill in the particular art, manufacture, or branch of science to 
which the alleged invention appertains.”223 It follows that, if experts 
were to be chosen for their skill in particular sciences, promotion of 
the progress of those sciences was among the objectives of the patent 
laws. In the context of the Progress Clause, this shows the application 
of the operative patent to both prefatory objects. 
2. Statutory Structure 
The observation that the copyright and patent laws are governed 
by distinct statutes is irrefutable. However, the mere separation of 
these two statutory regimes does not necessarily support a distributive 
reading of the Progress Clause as proposed by Justice Thompson and 
Karl Lutz. Instead, a more likely justification for their separation lies 
in the different standards for creation and enforcement of the rights. It 
is likely that the statutory distinction was dictated by policy concerns 
such as limiting the need for judicial interpretation, clarifying the 
differing standards between the two properties, and statutorily 
establishing the boundaries of the two rights. 
It is prudent to begin with the proposition that the two laws are 
meant to serve the same purposes
224
 and they do so in similar ways.
225
 
Despite the similarities at their ends—the purpose in the beginning, 
and the means of enforcement at the end—the two laws have very 
different intermediate concerns. Novelty and the scope of the 
exclusive rights conferred, for example, are justifiably very different 
between the two regimes. The recognition of this distinction by early 
congressmen is hardly enough to prove that the Progress Clause was 
intended to be read in the distributive. 
These concerns better explain the existence of separate statutory 
schemes for each than does the distributive reading of the Progress 
                                                                                                                            
 223. Id. at § 7. 
 224. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that Congress shall “promote Progress”); see 
also Lemley, supra note 204, at 993 (“Intellectual property is fundamentally about incentives to 
invent and create.”); O’Rourke, supra note 204, at 1180 (“[B]oth the copyright and patent laws 
have grappled with the question of how to safeguard the incentive inherent in the grant of 
exclusive rights . . . .”); John Shepard Wiley Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 119, 119 (1991) (“[T]he two laws perform the same function. . . . [N]o partisan 
recommends one goal for patent and another for copyright.”). 
 225. Both statutes create a non-tangible property right empowering the owner to exclude 
others from use. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2006) (providing for copyright infringement); 
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) (providing for patent infringement); 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006) 
(describing unfair import activities as those that infringe valid and enforceable patents or 
copyrights). 
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Clause. Copyright accrues upon the satisfaction of minimal creativity 
and is subject to several limitations.
226
 Patent, on the other hand, 
requires satisfaction of more stringent novelty standards, but provides 
much stronger protection upon accrual under expansive doctrines like 
the doctrine of equivalents.
227
 A given patent, then, can exert a 
stronger force on related works than can a given copyright. 
Admittedly, many of these issues may not have been fully 
understood at the framing of the Constitution. However, the very 
evidence that Lutz used to support the distributive reading shows that 
the roots of these issues were understood. Rep. Burke wished to “take 
care of copyrights immediately . . . because it is almost as easy to 
ascertain literary as any other kind of property.”228 He recognized 
patents were a more difficult subject.
229
 The difficulty that Burke 
recognized seemingly had little effect on the passage of the bills. The 
two original Progress bills were passed less than eight weeks apart.
230
 
Surprisingly, especially if Burke’s statements are given the weight 
afforded them by Lutz, the copyright bill was not the first passed; 
patent was.
231
 
Burke’s statement that patent would require more discussion 
than copyright
232
 seems to indicate that he was at least generally 
cognizant of the differing concerns. It is also worth noting that Burke 
was a Representative from South Carolina—the only state to pass 
patent legislation under the Articles of Confederation.
233
 It is likely 
that, as a Representative and one-time judge of that state,
234
 Burke 
was quite aware of the distinguishing issues that the two laws faced. 
                                                                                                                            
 226. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991); 17 
U.S.C. §§ 107-122 (2006). 
 227. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 24 (1997) 
(holding that the test for equivalence is “whether the substitution [of one element for the other] . 
. . is a change of substance as to make the doctrine of equivalents inapplicable; or conversely . . . 
whether the change was so insubstantial” that doctrine of equivalents applies); see also  
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (doctrine of 
equivalents may be invoked if a device “performs substantially the same function in 
substantially the same way to obtain the same result.”). 
 228. See Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 52. 
 229. See id. 
 230. Wiley, supra note 224, at 119. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 52. 
 233. Act of Mar. 26, 1784 (S.C.), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 180, 
at 23 (emphasis added). 
 234. See Burke, Aedanus, (1743 – 1802), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=B001086 (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
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This shows that the first Congress had many concerns in mind 
while drafting the first copyright and patent acts. It is quite possible 
that a grammatical quirk in the Progress Clause was one of these 
concerns, but the recognized difficulty in developing a statute to 
properly guide the judiciary in the fields of patent and copyright law 
implies that Congress was aware of the need for different standards 
for each. Congress’s recognition of these policy concerns explains the 
separation of copyright from patent at least as adequately as does a 
grammatical argument. It does not, however, indicate on its own that 
the Framers intended for the Progress Clause to be read in 
distribution. 
3. Judicial Interpretation 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, courts cited the written 
description provision’s enablement clause in two different ways. 
Sometimes they quoted the entirety of the provision, including the 
term “science”.235 Other times, courts cited to the statute, but referred 
only to the person skilled in the art.
236
 Some courts referred 
interchangeably to persons skilled in the art and persons skilled in the 
art or science.
237
 That citations in both forms were frequently made by 
the same courts over an extended period of time, and even made in 
the same decisions at times,
238
 suggests that rather than a developing 
aversion to science as patent-eligible subject matter, reference only to 
those skilled in the art was merely a shorthand citation form. It does 
not appear to be a shift in the judicial understanding of the Progress 
Clause, and certainly no reference was made to a balanced reading. 
Cases addressing expert witnesses are also particularly 
informative. What today is called “mechanical engineering” was 
frequently referred to as “mechanical science” in early patent cases.239 
One court went so far in its discussion as to place science prominently 
alongside things freely accepted today as patent eligible useful arts, 
                                                                                                                            
 235. See, e.g., Hogg v. Emerson, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 437, 484 (1848); Shaw v. Cooper, 32 
U.S. (7 Pet.) 292, 294-95 (1833); Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 226 (1832); Evans v. 
Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 380-81 (1822); Parker v. Stiles, 18 F.Cas. 1163, 1172 (C.C. Ohio 
1849); Allen v. Blunt, 1 F.Cas. 448, 450 (C.C. Mass. 1845). 
 236. See, e.g., Wood v. Underhill, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 1, 4 (1847); Carver v. Hyde, 41 U.S. 
513, 515-16 (1842). 
 237. See, e.g., Hogg, 47 U.S. at 462, 484; Raymond, 31 U.S. at 219, 226. 
 238. See Raymond, 31 U.S. at 226 (referring to one “skilled in the art or science”). But see 
id. at 239 (referring to one “skilled in the art”). 
 239. See, e.g., Parker, 18 F.Cas. at 1176; Foote v. Silsby, 9 F.Cas. 373, 380 
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1849); Blunt, 1 F.Cas. at 450; Brooks v. Jenkins, 4 F.Cas. 275, 280 (C.C. Ohio 
1844) (all referring to mechanical sciences). 
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including physics and chemistry.
240
 
Justice Story provided one of the most detailed discussions in 
this area.
241
 It is worth noting from the outset that the Justice’s 
discussion comes from a case handed down in 1845.
242
 It is therefore 
not truly contemporaneous with the Constitution, but it was handed 
down only a decade after Justice Thompson’s initial observation of 
the distributive reading.
243
 It is therefore as credible as Justice 
Thompson’s reference to the proper reading of the Progress Clause. It 
is also worth noting that Justice Story was nominated to the Supreme 
Court in 1811—very close to ratification of the Constitution—by 
James Madison, one of the two men responsible for the Progress 
Clause.
244
 
Justice Story made clear his view in discussing novelty and 
enablement: 
Still, it is obvious, that although a mere artisan, who had no 
scientific knowledge on the subject, and who was unacquainted 
with the various mechanical or chemical equivalents employed in 
such cases, might not be able to make or compound the thing 
patented, from the specification; yet a person who was skilled in 
the very science on which it depended, and with the mechanical 
and chemical powers and equivalents, might be able to teach and 
demonstrate to an artisan how it was to be made or constructed, or 
compounded or used. A fortiori he would be enabled so to do, if he 
combined practical skill with a thorough knowledge of the 
scientific principles on which it depended. But upon the question 
of the novelty of an invention, and in reference to this, the identity 
or diversity of two or more machines, or compounds, it is obvious, 
that mere artisans, however well skilled in the mere details of their 
art, might be wholly incapable of giving a satisfactory answer; 
when a person trained in the science to which it belonged, would, 
at a glance, ascertain whether the mechanical apparatus or 
chemical compound was identical in its composition and structure 
                                                                                                                            
 240. See Brooks, 4 F.Cas. at 281.  
[Y]ou perceive that the science of mechanics . . . affords a range for the highest 
mental vigor, and requires as deep thought, as nice a discrimination, as any other 
pursuit. The lights of chemistry, and of the highest branches of the mathematics, 
are subservient to it. No one can be an accomplished mechanist, who has not 
studied with some success the laws of physics.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 241. Blunt, 1 F.Cas. at 450. 
 242. Id. 
 243. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 684 (1834) (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
 244. See supra Part IV.B.2.b. 
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or not, or whether the differences consisted in the mere change of 
one known mechanical equivalent for another. In short, science 
alone would be able to answer the question whether or not a 
particular machine was substantially in its mode of operation new, 
or identical with another, although with apparent differences of 
form and structure, which might mislead the unscientific mind. 
The like considerations would apply to a chemical 
compound . . . .
245
 
Justice Story did not think “mere artisans,” or those “skilled in 
the mere details of their art,” capable of understanding the workings 
of technical inventions.
246
 Instead, it is those “skilled in the science 
upon which it depends” to which patent courts should look.247 Justice 
Story made clear that he believed “science alone” is able to answer 
the question of novelty for a given invention.
248
 
Justice Story’s language also indicates that he viewed mechanics 
and chemistry as science, and not useful art. The quoted language 
hints that Justice Story understood an artisan to be one who practices 
an invention or puts the invention into effect—what might be 
described as a skilled laborer today. Those skilled in science are the 
ones truly capable of promoting progress.
249
 According to Justice 
Story, it was the person “skilled in the very science” pertaining to the 
invention that might be able to “teach and demonstrate” how to 
practice an invention to an artisan.
250
 
4. Conclusion to be Drawn from Post-Ratification History 
Unlike the pre-ratification history, the post-ratification history is 
rather inconsistent. Some of the evidence seems to indicate that the 
Progress Clause was given a distributive reading. Equally forceful 
evidence supports a unitary reading. The only thing that can be taken 
from this period with any certainty is that the distributive reading was 
not the well-established doctrine that De Wolf and Lutz would paint it 
as. 
                                                                                                                            
 245. Blunt, 1 F.Cas. at 450 (emphasis added). 
 246. See id. 
 247. See id. 
 248. See id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
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V. THE UNITARY READING UNDER HELLER 
With this historical background in mind, it is time to turn to the 
actual construction of the Progress Clause. This Part briefly addresses 
the reasoning inherent in the Lutz article for the purpose of showing 
that that reasoning is not persuasive upon a deeper review of the 
relevant history. It then turns to the Heller analysis and applies the 
foregoing history. After this, it offers some final observations on the 
history of the intellectual property laws and the Progress Clause. 
A. The Textual Interpretation 
Constitutional analysis begins with the proposition that where 
the language of a provision is clear, there is no need to engage in 
construction.
251
 The foregoing history and the language of the 
Progress Clause show that it is not such a provision. First, the 
distributive reading did not become the generally accepted reading 
until more than a century and a half after the Framing.
252
 Second, as 
the history described above shows, the terminology of the Clause is 
ambiguous at best. Both of these points demonstrate that there are at 
least two reasonable interpretations of the Progress Clause, and 
construction is therefore necessary to ascertain the proper scope and 
meaning of the Clause. 
When construction is necessary, it is important to take a 
historical look at the “state of things” at the time a constitutional 
provision is adopted.
253
 This historical background is relevant to 
determining what the “normal and ordinary” meaning of 
constitutional language was to “ordinary citizens of the founding 
generation.”254 Evidence of contemporary interpretation can also 
speak to the understanding of those ordinary citizens.
255
 
                                                                                                                            
 251. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 338-39 (1816) (“If the text be 
clear and distinct, no restriction upon its plain and obvious import ought to be admitted, unless 
the inference be irresistible.”); see also United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931) 
(“[W]here the intention is clear there is no room for construction and no excuse for interpolation 
or addition.”). 
 252. See Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 463-64 (describing the 1949 Lutz argument as 
the basis for general acceptance of the distributive reading). 
 253. See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 723 (1838) (“In the 
construction of the constitution we must look to the history of the times, and examine the state 
of things existing when it was framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, the mischief, and 
the remedy.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 254. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576-77 (2008). 
 255. See id. at 605-19 (using post-ratification commentary, legislation and case law on the 
Second Amendment to assist in construction of that constitutional provision). 
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The foregoing historical discussion speaks directly to this “state 
of things” and to the understanding of ordinary citizens. Admittedly, 
there is some evidence that supports reading the Progress Clause as 
requiring separate patent and copyright laws. They were legislated 
separately, and the Patent Act’s title indicated that it was intended to 
protect the useful arts.
256
 The Clause is, arguably, a balanced sentence 
that links science, authors and writings together, separate from useful 
arts, inventors and discoveries.
257
 That, however, is the extent of the 
evidence that supports a distributive reading. 
First, addressing Lutz’s position that the rejection of a single 
piece of legislation in favor of two, it is worth noting that the very 
first proposed piece of copyright and patent legislation was intended 
to address them both together.
258
 This unitary bill was even passed on 
its first reading.
259
 The laws were not separated until it was observed 
that policy reasons called for separation.
260
 These facts seem to 
indicate that the Progress Clause was understood to be a unitary 
provision, and copyright and patent were not separate in the minds of 
the early legislators until a viable justification was given. Even then, 
they were only separated in legislation; the only evidence for this 
separation is a suggestion that patent was more difficult to deal with 
than copyright
261—there is no evidence that there was a new 
understanding that the Progress Clause granted two separate powers. 
Further, as has been shown, much more historical evidence 
supports the unitary reading of the Progress Clause. Among other 
things, patents were first applied in England to expressive, or 
“scientific” content rather than useful arts.262 These rights were still 
being enforced in the late eighteenth century.
263
 Similarly, there is 
                                                                                                                            
 256. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (bearing the title “An Act to 
promote the progress of useful Arts.”); see also Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 684 
(1834) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (“Th[e Progress Clause] is to be construed distributively, and 
must have been so understood; for when congress came to execute this power by legislation, the 
subjects are kept distinct, and very different provisions are made respecting them.”). 
 257. See DE WOLF, supra note 18, at 15; see also Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, 
at 51. 
 258. See Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 52. 
 259. Id. 
 260. See id. (noting Representative Burke’s observation that literary property was easy to 
acquire while inventive property was more difficult). 
 261. See id. 
 262. See LINACRE, supra note 134 (claiming a printing privilege in 1512); see also 
PATTERSON, supra note 131, at 42 (stating that the first printing “privilege from the sovereign” 
was granted in 1518). 
 263. See generally Stationers’ Co. v. Carnan, (1775) 96 Eng. Rep. 590 (K.B.). 
MILLER 3/23/2012  11:28 AM 
280 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 28 
evidence that members of the Continental Congress, including James 
Madison, viewed copyright as a tool for encouraging the development 
of useful arts and discoveries.
264
 
Evidence from after the adoption of the Progress Clause also 
demonstrates the understanding that “ordinary citizens” had of the 
provision. The 1790 Patent Act, by far the shortest-lived iteration of 
the Patent Act to date, was amended in 1793 to expressly include the 
word “science.”265 Another reference to the word “science” was added 
in the 1836 revision.
266
 
This evidence, along with the remainder of the aforementioned 
historical background, constitutes the first mechanism in the 
construction of the Progress Clause. While historical practice does not 
lead conclusively to one construction or the other, the fact that a 
definitive construction of the Progress Clause eludes our grasp lends 
itself to the conclusion that the Clause was meant and understood to 
be broad. Given that patent law was applied to science and useful arts, 
while copyright was viewed as conducive to the encouragement of 
science and the useful arts, is certainly ambiguous. Yet it is that 
ambiguity that best explains the scope of the Progress Clause: it was 
meant to be given a unitary reading. Perhaps it was the wisdom of the 
Framers to make the Clause ambiguous in order to avoid disputes 
over which power the exclusive right to what subject matter arose 
under. 
An examination of the relevant history and understanding of the 
Progress Clause—the very same framework used by Lutz—does not 
conclusively establish that copyrights are limited to science and that 
patents are limited to useful arts. The Progress Clause is, in fact, 
susceptible to a much broader interpretation, and the Supreme Court 
often comes down in favor of the broader interpretation.
267
 As 
                                                                                                                            
 264. See, e.g., BUGBEE, supra note 178 at 113 (presenting the view of copyright as 
something that can promote the useful arts); Resolution of May 2, 1783, reprinted in 
COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 179 at 11 (presenting copyright as capable of promoting 
useful discoveries). 
 265. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318 (1793). 
 266. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, §§ 6-7, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). 
 267. A subset of due process, for example, has led to an unwritten right to privacy. See 
Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (“Although ‘(t)he Constitution does 
not explicitly mention any right of privacy,’ the Court has recognized that one aspect of the 
‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is ‘a right of 
personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy.’) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)). There are other examples of the Court opting for the least restrictive 
interpretation of other constitutional provisions. The Supreme Court has read the Second 
Amendment as protecting the right of all citizens to keep and bear arms, rather than limiting the 
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Professor Oliar has argued, the purely historical mechanism of 
constitutional interpretation seems to call for a unitary reading.
268
 
B. The Heller Interpretation 
As discussed above, the Progress Clause shares a similar 
structure with the Second Amendment.
269
 The article now applies the 
Heller framework to the historical evidence as the second mechanism 
of constitutional interpretation. 
The first step under Heller is to determine the meaning of the 
operative clause.
270
 This article has not challenged the modern 
understanding of the operative language. Therefore, it treats “authors” 
and “writings” as the subjects of copyright law and “inventors” and 
“discoveries” as the subjects of patent law.271 This Article has also not 
challenged the language of the prefatory clause, so the second step 
needs no analysis. 
It is the third step—the consistency between the prefatory and 
operative clauses—that really matters to the Progress Clause. There is 
very little historical evidence that suggests an unambiguous 
separation of science as the object of copyright and useful arts as the 
object of patent.
272
 Indeed, there is significantly more evidence that 
speaks to an overlap in the subject matter of the regimes.
273
 Without 
rehashing the prior historical review, a few facts speak directly to the 
question of whether science and the useful arts must be treated 
separately from the viewpoint of the operative clause. 
With respect to science, the very first domestic English patent 
covered a book—a device of general knowledge, not a useful art.274 
                                                                                                                            
provision to only militiamen. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 596 (2008). This 
habit of broad interpretation has also extended to congressional powers. The Interstate 
Commerce Clause, which could reasonably be interpreted to only allow Congress to govern 
interstate commerce, has been interpreted to allow Congress to control intrastate activity as well. 
See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (observing that the Interstate Commerce 
power can extend to “intrastate activities” that may have an effect on interstate commerce). The 
Spending Clause has been interpreted to allow Congress to expand its power by indirectly 
achieving results that Congress could not otherwise have achieved. See South Dakota v. Dole, 
483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (holding that the spending power may be used by Congress to 
indirectly achieve “objectives which Congress is not empowered to achieve directly.”). 
 268. See Oliar, Convention, supra note 5, at 463-69; see also Oliar, Making Sense, supra 
note 13, at 1823. 
 269. See supra Part III.B. 
 270. Heller, 554 U.S. at 578. 
 271. See supra Part V.B. 
 272. See supra Part IV. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
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Similar patents were still being granted and enforced in England at 
around the time of the Framing.
275
 According to Lutz, general 
knowledge falls under the term science.
276
 If true, this means that the 
Framers would have understood patents to be applicable to science. 
Likewise, there is clear evidence of a relationship between 
copyright and useful arts. The Continental Congress appointed a 
committee “to consider the most proper means of cherishing genius 
and useful arts throughout the United States by securing to the 
authors or publishers of new books their property in such works.”277 
States were encouraged to adopt copyright laws to promote these 
useful arts.
278
 
Given this history, the distributive reading’s use of science and 
useful arts to limit the scope of copyright and patent is in direct 
conflict with the Heller framework. Because patent and copyright 
were understood to apply to both the sciences and useful arts, the 
distributive reading improperly contracts the scope of the operative 
language by importing prefatory limitations.
279
 
This begs the question: what is the proper scope of patent and 
copyright? The unitary reading of the Progress Clause takes the 
Constitution to grant power to Congress for one purpose: to promote 
the progress of science and the useful arts. That is the extent of the 
proposed change from the distributive reading, which treats the 
promotion of science and promotion of useful arts as separate and 
distinct powers.
280
 Patent and copyright remain conceptually distinct, 
but under the unitary reading, there is one single purpose to the 
Progress Clause. The result is that patent law secures the discoveries 
of inventors, whether those discoveries are part of science or the 
useful arts. Copyright likewise secures the writings of authors, 
whether they are part of science or the useful arts. The current 
expression/application dichotomy does not conflict with this reading. 
The language of the Progress Clause makes the separation of the 
two regimes appropriate despite indications to the opposite. Although 
history makes clear that patent may protect science or useful arts, and 
likewise with copyright, the language of the Clause indicates that the 
                                                                                                                            
 275. See Stationers’ Co. v. Carnan, (1775) 96 Eng. Rep. 590 (K.B.). 
 276. Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 50. 
 277. BUGBEE, supra note 178, at 112. 
 278. See supra note 179. 
 279. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577-78 (2008). 
 280. Lutz, Patents and Science, supra note 4, at 51. 
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full scope of these regimes is not applicable in all cases: only the 
discoveries of inventors and the writings of authors may be protected. 
The operative clause therefore places a limitation upon what types of 
progress may be protected, but it does not place a limitation upon the 
subject matter of these works (i.e., whether they are science or useful 
art). 
The critical point of this reading, in the context of the Heller 
analysis, is that it is the operative clause that dictates the distinction, 
and not the prefatory clause. The unitary reading only places 
limitations in accord with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, while 
the distributive reading limits the Progress Clause based on purposive 
language. 
According to the proposed reading, both regimes are subject to 
several limitations similar to those of the current reading. Neither 
patent nor copyright is extended to any idea or fact, nor does either 
right enable an author or inventor to withdraw information from the 
public domain, because protecting such would not serve to promote 
progress, and would not be in accord with the original purposes of 
patent and copyright. These limitations remain unchanged from the 
law under the distributive reading.
281
 
The major distinction between copyright and patent under the 
proposed reading is the formal requirements to qualify for each. 
These requirements under the unitary reading are very similar to those 
under the distributive reading. It is well established that copyright 
inures in expressive content.
282
 Patent, so courts have hinted, is 
appropriately used to promote the progress of “applicative” works—
works that apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas 
in a useful manner.
283
 Therefore, the unitary reading makes little 
                                                                                                                            
 281. Neither patent nor copyright protects ideas or facts. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1991) (“The most fundamental axiom of copyright 
law is that ‘[n]o author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates.’”); accord Diamond v. 
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”). Nor may either work serve to withdraw already-
existing information from the public domain. See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 
F.2d 693, 710 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[Public domain] material is free for the taking and cannot be 
appropriated by a single author even though it is included in a copyrighted work.”); 35 U.S.C. § 
102 (2006) (generally denying patent protection for previously known, used or described 
inventions). 
 282. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954) (stating that expression is 
copyrightable); see also Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (stating 
that “writings” in the Progress Clause means the “literary productions . . . by which the ideas in 
the mind of the author are given visible expression.”). 
 283. See Joshua I. Miller, Unknown Futures and the Known Past: What Can Patent Learn 
from Copyright in the New Technological Age?, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 56-58 (2011) 
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change to eligibility law for either regime, save for its inclusion of 
science as appropriate subject matter for patent protection (copyright, 
it should be noted, has never really refused protection to works of 
authorship on the useful arts).
284
 
The transition from distributive to unitary reading does not result 
in a major shift in the law. The theoretical foundations of patent and 
copyright remain largely unchanged. The progress standards in each 
still operate to limit protection to those things not yet in the public 
domain and the types of work that patent and copyright each protect 
remains unchanged. The only difference is that the progress of 
science now falls within the scope of patent and the progress of useful 
arts now expressly falls within the scope of copyright. This shift has 
little impact on most areas of law, but better explains their existence 
than the distributive reading.
285
 
C. Observations on the Unitary Reading 
There is one final observation worth making that is neither facial 
nor structural. That is that the unitary reading is actually in accord 
with earlier English law. First, early patents all arose under the same 
power—the Royal Prerogative.286 More important, these early English 
patents were granted for the same purpose. That purpose, generally 
put, was to encourage and expand English industrial advancement.
287
 
After the enactment of the Statute of Monopolies, which created 
the first legal distinction between industrial and printing patents,
288
 
these distinct rights were still governed by the same statute.
289
 In this 
sense, then, the Statute of Monopolies very much hinted at the unitary 
reading of the American Progress Clause: two separate, but related, 
rights, granted to the same purpose. This is very similar to the unitary 
reading of the Progress Clause. 
In the end, it can be seen that, while the unitary reading of the 
                                                                                                                            
(arguing that patent law has hinted at, and in some cases, used, an “application” standard to 
determine patent eligibility); see also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an 
application of a law of nature or a mathematical formula to a known structure or process may 
well be deserving of patent protection.”). 
 284. Clearly, scientific textbooks or articles qualify for copyright protection, and promote 
the progress of useful arts. 
 285. See infra Part V for a discussion of the effect the unitary reading has on several areas 
of law. 
 286. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 287. See Mossoff, Development, supra note 94, at 1259; Klitzke, supra note 107, at 625. 
 288. Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 & 22 Jac. I, c. 3, §§ 6, 9, 10. (Eng.). 
 289. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. 
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Clause is something relatively new in modern American 
jurisprudence,
290
 the general idea is actually inherent in the furthest 
ancestors of the Progress Clause. Given the Heller Court’s reliance on 
history, this historical observation lends credence to the structural 
analysis presented in the Article. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that the history of the Progress Clause 
does not fit as neatly into the distributive reading as Lutz argued. 
Indeed, the plain history of the Progress Clause is, at most, 
ambiguous. Typically, constitutional ambiguities like this have been 
interpreted in the broadest manner—here, the unitary reading—rather 
than the narrowest manner. More importantly, though, the Supreme 
Court has recently explained how the structure of a constitutional 
provision can contribute to our understanding of the provision. 
Although the structure of the Progress Clause is not exactly identical 
to the structure of the Second Amendment, this Article has argued 
that the structures are similar enough that the Supreme Court’s 
Second Amendment analysis can inform our analysis of the Progress 
Clause. 
Following the Court’s analysis, one is once again forced to 
conclude that the unitary reading is the correct reading. Historically, it 
was understood that patents could apply to science, and copyright to 
useful arts. Therefore, given the Heller Court’s requirement of a 
logical connection between the two clauses of a constitutional 
provision, the Progress Clause must be understood to allow patent or 
copyright to apply to science or useful arts. 
 
                                                                                                                            
 290. It does not appear that the reading was proposed in any form until 2006. See Oliar, 
Making Sense, supra note 13, at 1823. 
